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TEACHING LAWYERS THE LANGUAGE OF
LAW: LEGAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
TRANSLATIONS*
ELIZABETH MERTZ**
Generally insensitive to context, legal analysis as it is reflected in
judicial opinions can leave out much that seems relevant to an
assessment of whether justice has been done. I cannot count the
number of times that I have come to the end of an opinion and been
perplexed and dismayed because some essential fact or element
seemed to be missing. The opinion could not possibly contain the
whole story. There had to be something else about the particular
circumstancesor the larger setting, which frames it that would have
made the parties' actions explicable or the courts' rulings more
intelligible.1
INTRODUCTION
The intriguing focus of this symposium' is the challenge posed
to legal educators by the "diverse social, anthropological, political,
philosophical, and analytical forces" that confront them everyday.
These forces emanate not only from the "law itself," but also from
the students and professors engaged in the dynamic process of
socialization into the legal profession.
The symposium title
emphasizes that we are examining these forces through the lens of
language, and we are asking how the languages of race, feminism,
philosophy, and anthropology translate in the legal skills
classroom. I am honored and pleased to have been asked to write
about the discipline of anthropology, the social science field that is
my own "home base." As someone trained in both anthropology
Copyright Elizabeth Mertz 2000.
Senior Research Fellow, American Bar Foundation; Associate Professor,
University of Wisconsin Law School. I wish to express my thanks to the
American Bar Foundation and the Spencer Foundation for funding this
project, to Nancy Matthews and Susan Gooding, my project managers, to
Wamucii Njogu, who oversaw the final quantitative work, and to the very
talented team of researchers who assisted in data collection and analysis.
1. Regina Austin, Contextual Analysis, Race Discrimination, and Fast
Food, Paper presented at The John Marshall Law School November 4, 1999
(on file with author).
2. This article is part of The John Marshall Law School's symposium
entitled: "The Languages of Race, Feminism, Philosophy, and Anthropology:
Translating for Legal Skills Classroom."
*
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and law, I continually confront the dilemma of translating
between two radically different fields. In this paper, I hope to
share with you some of the discomfort as well as the excitement of
performing this difficult task.
I begin with a translation of law and legal training into the
discourse of anthropology. For a number of years, I have been
conducting a study of the language of legal education using the
methods and analytic tools of linguistic anthropology. The first
section of this paper reports some of the results of that study.
Overall, the analysis reveals that the legal language taught in
first-year classrooms in the United States carries with it an
intrinsically decontextualized approach to morality.
This
approach wrests lawyers from the contextualized forms of
normative judgment commonly found among laypeople. I will
discuss both the putative benefits and troubling detriments that
follow from this approach to ethical and moral judgment. In a
sense, this study provides the backdrop for Regina Austin's
analysis, in this symposium, of the decontextual character of legal
reasoning.3 This article examines the processes law schools
employ to habituate students to this decontextualized form of legal
reasoning, reporting on how initiates to the profession-the law
students themselves-learn to approach problems this way.
The final section of this paper asks whether the language
taught to lawyers is actually capable of translating the kinds of
insights generated by a discipline such as anthropology. On the
one hand, my conclusion can be read as somewhat pessimistic.
Given the profound discursive and epistemological differences
between the two fields, any effort to translate one into the other
must proceed with both caution and modesty. On the other hand,
it is precisely by integrating perspectives such as those offered by
anthropology that the U.S. legal language--as well as the legal
system it encodes, and the educational institutions that teach
it-might respond to some of the most pressing challenges facing
them today.
I.

TEACHING LEGAL LANGUAGE: A PERSISTENT PUZZLE IN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Previous research on law school education has drawn upon a
number of different disciplines and approaches. Issues addressed
in these studies range from the effects of legal education on
students' psychological health, or on their commitment to public
interest work, through historical questions about the evolution of
legal training in the United States.4 A number of studies have
3. See generally Austin, supra note 1.
4. See generally ROBERT BOCKING STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983); ROBERT V.

20001

The Language of Law

focused on a distinctive style of pedagogy associated with doctrinal
teaching in U.S. law schools.
From a number of different
vantages, legal scholars and social scientists often remark on a
persistent puzzle: the Socratic method and associated approaches
to teaching law found in many first-year doctrinal classes do not
seem to make sense. These techniques do not appear to convey
legal constructs any more effectively than would other methods
such as lecturing. Moreover, the Socratic method has been the
subject of a great deal of criticism and has been connected to
elevated student stress.
Additionally, it fails to adequately
prepare attorneys for practice.
How, then, has doctrinal
teaching-particularly doctrinal teaching using a Socratic
approach--continued in use for so long?
The study reported in this article examines legal education
from a novel standpoint, drawing on the methods and theory of
anthropological linguistics.5 Anthropological studies of language
begin with the premise that it is crucial to actually observe
people's use of language in context, rather than to rely on their
reports of how they speak. The accuracy of a speaker's perceptions
regarding his or her own speech can vary widely, and even when
they are correct as to general patterns, such perceptions cannot
achieve the level of detail required by anthropological linguists. In
order to obtain detailed data on language patterns in first-year
classrooms, we taped the entire first semester of Contracts classes
in eight different law schools. The schools varied across the
prestige hierarchy used to provide school rankings (despite the
many criticisms of such rankings). Although there were many
interesting differences among the classrooms, this research
uncovered a shared underlying "message" imparted to law
students in all the schools and classrooms examined in the study.
As I will explain, careful examination of this message or
worldview helps to explain the puzzle of the "Socratic method" of
legal education. The distinctive epistemology that underlies legal
language, as it is taught in doctrinal classrooms, fits very well
with overall goals and features of the legal system in the United
States. Thus, there is a symbolic "fit" that connects teaching
method, legal language, the legal system, and that system's
STOVER,

MAKING IT AND BREAKING

IT:

THE FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST

COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL (1989); Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on

the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1971). For a general review of scholarship
on legal education, see OLAVI MARU, RESEARCH ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION: A
REVIEW OF WORK DONE (1985).

5. Susan Philips pioneered work in this area. Her article, "The Language
Socialization of Lawyers: Acquiring the 'Cant,'" was the first examination of
legal education using linguistic anthropological techniques. Susan Philips,
The Language Socialization of Lawyers: Acquiring the 'Cant,' in DOING THE
ETHNOGRAPHY OF SCHOOLING: EDUCATIONAL ANTHROPOLOGY IN ACTION 176

(George Dearborn Spindler ed., 1982).

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:91

underlying worldview.' This symbolic connection makes sense of
the persistence of certain Socratic aspects of legal teaching,
despite ongoing complaints about efficacy, fairness to students of
differing backgrounds, and negative impacts on students. The
cultural logic entailed by the fundamental worldview taught to law
students alters incipient lawyers' orientations concerning human
conflict, authority, and morality. A crucial aspect of this changed
orientation involves training students to read texts with a new
focus, so that they learn to interpret stories of conflict in legal
terms. When viewed through this lens, traditional legal pedagogy
symbolically mirrors and reinforces an epistemology that is vital to
the legal system's legitimacy.
We begin with a brief review of the "puzzle" surrounding the
entrenchment of traditional pedagogy in doctrinal classes. I will
then summarize the findings of the research, first focusing on
features that are found across all of the first-year classrooms in
the study. Then I will address the differences among these
classrooms in their structures of participation and verbal
interaction.
Building from these findings, this section will
conclude by explaining, in detail, the symbolic fit between
pedagogy and legal worldview.
A. The "Puzzle" of First-YearDoctrinalTeaching
The genealogy of the Socratic method in United States legal
education reaches back to the nineteenth century, when
Christopher Columbus Langdell brought this distinctive style to
the Harvard Law School. Although the intellectual underpinnings
of Langdell's approach have long since lost their credibility among
legal academics, many aspects of the pedagogy that he developed
from those conceptual foundations continued to survive for over a
century. Critics of the Socratic method and other traditional
methods of teaching law vigorously debate the merits of this
tradition.7 These scholars charge that students either do not

6. As I explain elsewhere, this legal worldview also helps in
understanding a number of other findings from the social science literature on
legal education. For example, once certain aspects of this legal epistemology
are understood, we can more easily comprehend the kind of complex findings
that are now emerging regarding the impact of gender and race on legal
training. These findings indicate that the impact of law school on students is

contextually dependent and variable. Furthermore, the often remarked
negative effect of legal education on the public interest ambitions of law
students is in fact predictable from the cultural logic underlying this legal
pedagogy.

See generally Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Education, in LAW'S

DISCIPLINARY ENCOUNTERS (Bryant Garth et al. eds., 2001) (manuscript in
preparation, on file with the author).
7. For a discussion and critique of the Socratic method in the legal
classroom, see generally DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE

REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (1983);
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absorb moral values or that they absorb largely deleterious values;
skeptics have further asserted that this kind of teaching does not
even successfully convey legal doctrine, and that students exit law
school without adequate preparation for the practice of law.8
While this last criticism did not end the use of Socratic training, it
contributed to a partially successful movement for clinical
education in law schools.! Some scholars express concern that,
historically, as the Socratic method became more popular, legal
pedagogy and the legal profession moved further away from a
model of lawyers as moral decision-makers. These writers observe
that embracing Landell's scientism entailed an abandonment of
moral considerations, and a concomitant shift toward an image of
law as a field of technical expertise. ° Moreover, critical legal
theorists interpret this emphasis on technical expertise as actually
embodying a new morality, one that favors the privileged in
society." In addition, multiple studies find that law students tend
to lose their desire to pursue altruistic or public interest career
goals as they move further into their legal education." Social
scientists also criticize the Socratic method from psychological and
other perspectives, uncovering its
3 negative effects on self-esteem
and interpersonal relationships.
Robert Condlin, Socrates' New Clothes: Substituting Persuasionfor Learning
in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. 223 (1981); William C.
Heffernan, Not Socrates, but Protagoras: The Sophistic Basis of Legal
Education, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 399 (1980); Jacob Landman, Anent the Case
Method of Studying Law, 4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 139 (1927); John W. Wade, Some
Observations on the Present State of Law Teaching and the Student Response,
35 MERCER L. REV. 753 (1984).
8. See, e.g., David Bryden, What Do Law Students Learn? A Pilot Study,
34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 479 (1984); Landman, supra note 7; Karl Llewellyn, The
Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 211 (1948); Edwin
Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC.
1 (1951); James B. White, Doctrine in a Vacuum, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155
(1986).
9. See, e.g., A.S. Cutler, Inadequate Law School Training:A Plan To Give
Students Actual Practice, 37 A.B.A. J. 203 (1951); Leon Thomas David, The
Clinical Lawyer-School: The Clinic, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1934); Edward Devitt,
Why Don't Law Schools Teach Law Students How To Try Lawsuits? 29 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 631 (1980); William Vukowich, The Lack of Practical Training in
Law Schools, 23 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 140 (1971).
10. WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF
PROFESSIONAL CULTURES, at xvii (1978); FRANCES KAHN ZEMANS & VICTOR G.
ROSENBLUM, THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION 204-06 (1981).
11. See KENNEDY, supra note 7, at 17-20. See also Thomas Shaffer, Moral
Implicationsand Effects of Legal Education, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 190 (1984).
12. See generally STOVER, supra note 4; Howard S. Erlanger et al., Law
Student Idealism and Job Choice: Some New Data on an Old Question, 30 LAW
& SOC. REV. 9 (1966); Howard S. Erlanger & Douglas A. Klegon, Socialization
Effects of Professional School: The Law School Experience and Students'
Orientationto School Reform, 13 LAW & SOC. REV. 11 (1978).
13. See Stone, supra note 4, at 412-28 (discussing the psychological effects
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Supporters of the Socratic method, on the other hand, assert
that the method mirrors the style of reasoning used by lawyers.
Additionally, they argue that it is an efficient system for teaching
large classrooms and that it stimulates active student
involvement. Supporters also maintain that the Socratic method
does not dominate and manipulate any more than do methods
used in clinical teaching. Additionally, they maintain that it
conveys, at once, the guiding principles and indeterminacy of the
law in a way that lectures could not. 4 In this paper, I will
demonstrate a different form of congruence between the canonical
Socratic method and legal thinking. This is not an argument that
the Socratic method has greater efficacy, certainly, given the
results of this and other studies, but is rather an argument for a
stronger symbolic resonance or "fit." "
Social scientists have also studied variations in the teaching
methods employed across different law schools as well as
differences in the skills imparted by particular methods. Several
studies found that differences between law schools correlated with
the school's prestige ranking-elite schools being less likely to
emphasize rigid rules and more likely to emphasize analytical
thinking and theory. 6 Garth, Martin and Landon asked urban
and rural attorneys to identify the skills taught by law schools
that were the most useful in legal practice. 7 Practitioners agreed
of legal education). Mitchell, taking a different approach, draws upon
cognitive and developmental theories of expert and novice thinking to develop
a list of suggested improvements upon the traditional teaching methodology.
John Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice Thinking: A Full
Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL ED. 275

(1989).
14. See generally ALBER HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES
(1953); Condlin, supra note 7; Heffernan, supra note 7; Thomas Konop, The
Case System-A Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 275 (1931); Pierre Louiseaux,
The Newcomer and the Case Method, 7 J. LEGAL EDUC. 244 (1954); Edmund
Morgan, The Case Method, 4 J. LEGAL EDUC. 379 (1952); Wade, supra note 7.
15. Studies of teaching methods have often produced negative results; there

is little, if any, relation found between the method used and the results. Thus,
controlled experiments in which first-year classes were divided into separate
groups, some taught Socratically and others not, resulted in generally similar

performances. When Bryden attempted to test the difference between first
and third-year abilities to perform functional analysis applying concepts to

facts, to distinguish holdings from dicta, and to construe ambiguous statutes,
he found less difference than would be expected, given that third-year

students had had a number of years of training under the Socratic method.
Bryden, supra note 8.
16. See ALFRED SMITH,

COGNITIVE

STYLES IN LAW SCHOOL (1979)

(discussing the willingness of a law school to adhere to rigid teaching styles);
ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 10, at 57.
17. See generally Bryant G. Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the
Construction of Competence, 43 J. LEGAL EDUc. 469, 472 (1993) [hereinafter
Construction of Competence] (drawing on surveys they conducted in Chicago
and Donald Landon conducted in Missouri); also Joanne Martin & Bryant G.
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that legal reasoning is the skill most important to practicing
lawyers that law schools address relatively well: "[t]here are some
relative successes in teaching the specifically legal skills of legal
reasoning, legal research, substantive law, and now also
professional responsibility." 8 Similarly, lawyers in a number of
studies overwhelmingly agreed that "'ability to think like a lawyer'
was the most important knowledge imparted by law schools." 9
This knowledge would include specific skills such as "fact
gathering," the "capacity to marshal facts and order them so that
concepts can be applied," and the "ability to understand and
interpret opinions, regulations, and statutes."" There is still a
puzzle as to why the Socratic method of teaching, as opposed to
any other approach, should be so important in conveying these
skills.
This study analyzes the Socratic method as an oral genre or
speech style, using the methods of sociolinguistics and
anthropological linguistics.
Sociolinguists have developed a
considerable literature on the social ramifications of different
discourse styles or genres as well as on the role of language in
classrooms. In what follows, I will build from this literature and
my own initial excavations of law school teaching to provide a
detailed analysis of the language of the law school classroom.2" In
addition, I will examine the issue of social inclusion and exclusion,
specifically focusing on race, gender, and status.2

Garth, Clinical Education as a Bridge Between Law School and Practice:
Mitigating the Misery, 1 CLINIcAL L. REV. 443 (1994).
18. Garth & Martin, Construction of Competence, supra note 17, at 508.
19. E.G. Gee & Donald Jackson, Current Studies of Legal Education:
Findings and Recommendations,

32

J.

LEGAL

ED.

471,

481

(1982)

(summarizing several studies).
20. ZEMANS & ROSENBLUM, supra note 10, at 136. Zemans and Rosenblum
found that lawyers viewed general and practical skills as most essential in
practice; these were the very skills that they felt were most lacking in their
law school education. Id.
21. No study to date has used tape and transcript analysis of law school
classes along the lines of sociolinguistic studies of other classroom settings.
However, there has been some close attention to law school training.
Although Stone's study does not use direct transcripts of classroom speech, he
employs a psychoanalytic framework to analyze observed interactions. See,
e.g., Stone, supra note 4. Shaffer and Redmount use transcript material to
illustrate their finding of "erosion" in the traditional Socratic style and to
demonstrate the advantages of more "low-pressure" teaching styles. Shaffer,
supra note 11, at 169-89. Stover and Philips use material from their own
experience as social scientists going to law school. See, e.g., STOVER, supra
note 4; Philips, supra note 5. Granfield uses some direct quotation of
classroom exchanges to illustrate aspects of law school training. See, e.g.,
ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD
AND BEYOND (1992).

22. Studies have tracked the ways in which law schools recruit students,
student adjustment during law school, and their paths after leaving law
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B. In the Law School Classroom: Learning a New Language for
Telling "Conflict Stories"
As noted earlier, my research on legal education involved
taping first semester Contracts classes in eight different law
schools. The law schools ranged from those generally recognized
as among the elite to those denominated "regional" and "local" by

scholars studying legal education. Observers ("in-class coders") in
each classroom also tracked the speakers, noting the gender and
race of each speaker as well as aspects of the "turn-taking" (for
example, did the speaker volunteer or did the professor call on the
speaker).
The tapes were subsequently transcribed, and
transcript coders encoded features of each turn, including length of

school. In many cases, these studies demonstrate that this channeling process
tends to exclude students from working class backgrounds as well as those
from other traditionally marginalized social groups. There has also been a
growing debate in recent years over possible differential impacts of law
teaching on students who were traditionally excluded from this elite domain,
particularly students of color, working-class students, and women. See Lani
Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 46, n. 117 (1994) (discussing the impact of
legal education on women); Suzanne Homer & Lois Schwartz, Admitted but
not Accepted: Outsiders Take an Inside Look at Law School, 5 BERKLEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 30 n.101, 51 (1990) (same). Most of the studies to date focus
on the problems of women in law school settings, with some suggesting a
relatively "chilly climate" in law classes for female students-a climate that
some have suggested may impact their performance. Recent work by Sander
and Knaplund demonstrates that even where the Socratic method does not
impact their performance, women have differentially negative responses to
their experience in law school. This is a finding supported by other studies as
well. Sander and Knaplund also found that women had more interest in
altruistic and public interest work, a factor that seems to correlate with
increased dissatisfaction during law school. See RICHARD H. SANDER AND
KRISTINE S. KNAPLUND, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON NATIONAL STUDY OF
STUDENT PERFORMANCE IN THE FIRST YEAR OF LAW SCHOOL (1999); see

generally Kristine S. Knaplund & Richard H. Sander, The Art and Science of
Academic Support, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1995) (analyzing the participation
in and satisfaction with support services at law schools by different groups
separated by factors including grades). In his fine-grained analysis of women
students' reactions to Harvard Law School, Robert Granfield similarly found
that women who entered legal training with "social justice" goals were more
likely to find law school alienating than were women with "individualistic"
goals. GRANFIELD, supra note 21, at 97. There have been far fewer studies
focusing on race or class than on gender in law school education, but the
available information indicates, if anything, more disparities in class
participation, and in overall feelings of inclusion and satisfaction, among
students of color. Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 527, 535-36 (1990). See also Homer & Schwartz, supra, at 50-54;
LINDA F. WIGHTMAN, WOMEN IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF THE
LAW SCHOOL EXPERIENCES OF WOMAN AND MEN: PERFORMANCE AND LAW

SCHOOL (1996). A number of recent articles have asked whether particular
teaching methods are responsible for any differential performance or
satisfaction among diverse groups of students.
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the turn, who spoke, and whether the turn was part of extended or
short dialogue, etc. In addition, both the in-class coders and
transcript coders noted qualitative aspects of the interactions.
As a result of access to both qualitative and quantitative
findings, this study combines an analysis of the underlying
message or worldview imparted to law students with an
examination of the patterns of classroom interaction between the
professors and students.
Despite strong differences in the
teaching and participation patterns among the classes, the study
finds a similar underlying decontextualized orientation to human
conflict, authority, morality, and text across all of the classrooms. 3
We can trace this approach by examining the way in which legal
pedagogy deconstructs and analyzes the underlying "conflict
stories" (the factual accounts of the underlying conflicts that led to
legal intervention) of each case. Although the linguistic structure
of Socratic teaching provides a particularly strong mirroring of
this orientation, even classrooms that did not employ the Socratic
method imparted the same decontextualized orientation to
students. Thus, all of these varying methods of legal instruction
manage to impart a shared cultural worldview throughout the
notably different classroom environments.
At the core of this legal epistemology is a distinctive
orientation toward human social conflict and related notions of
authority and morality. 4 Interestingly, achieving this orientation
involves the creation of a new relationship with language and text.
As law professors teach students to read and discuss legal texts,
the students learn to ask new questions and to focus on different
aspects of language than they had previously. Indeed, legal
education pushes students to direct their attention toward textual
and legal authority, casting aside issues of "right" and "wrong," of
emotion and empathy-the very feelings most likely to draw the
hearts of lay readers as they encounter tales of human conflict.
Instead, legal educators rigorously urge law students, as initiates
into the legal system, to put aside such considerations-not to
stifle them entirely, but push them to the margins of the discourse.
This process of reorientation has parallels in other kinds of
initiations. Anthropologists studying initiation rituals describe a
process whereby previous orientations and values are broken

23. I use "decontextulized" here as a shorthand reference to the bracketing
of social context in this approach. Of course, in another sense, the approach
taught to law students is not decontextualized at all because it is providing a

new, legally focused context for human conflict.
24. This approach is in the tradition of scholars such as Bourdieu and
Passeron, who view schooling as embodying and conveying social structure.
See generally PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION
IN EDUCATION, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE (1977).
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down, as identity is reformulated. 5 A sociological study of medical
school education in the United States suggests that the gross
anatomy lab experience during the first year of medical training
performs just such a function.26 As medical students dissect
human cadavers in the lab, joking behaviors and other casual
approaches to the task violate normal cultural taboos about death
and the body. Such detached behavior reorients students so that
they can adopt "the clinical attitude." As the days pass, these new
markedly different and prosaic approaches to the body being
dissected rupture students' earlier more reverential attitudes.
This is a crucial part of the students' initiation into their new
professional identities.
My study presents data suggesting that first-year law school
teaching performs a similar function.
However, instead of
breaking down attitudes toward the body and death, law
professors rupture linguistic norms. Law teaching challenges
students' previous attitudes toward speech, reading, and texts-at
the same time as it imparts a new approach to conflict, morality,
authority, and language. Just as the bodies in the laboratory are
the vehicles through which "the clinical attitude" is imparted to
medical students, the stories of conflict contained in legal texts
and language become vehicles through which the legal "initiates"
learn to "think like lawyers." The most canonical form of legal
instruction, the "Socratic method," has a linguistic structure that
precisely mirrors this reorientation. 7 I would therefore argue that
although the Socratic method, as a medium of teaching, may be no
more (or even less) effective than others, this approach to legal
pedagogy may continue to linger because of a symbolic "fit"
between the form and function of language. We begin with an
examination of the reorientation toward text, authority, and
morality that lies at the heart of first-year legal education. Then,
we consider related concepts of the person, human conflict, and
social context that are implicated in this linguistic re-ordering.
1. New Sources of Authority: Reconfiguring the Semantics and
Pragmaticsof Text
In all the classrooms of this study, law students learn to
refocus on new aspects of the legal texts with which they work
during their first-year classes. Educational research demonstrates

25. VICTOR TURNER, DRAMAS, FIELDS AND METAPHORS (1974); ARNOLD
VAN GENNEP, THE RITES OF PASSAGE (1960).
26. Peter Finkelstein, Studies in the Anatomy Laboratory: A Portrait of
Individual and Collective Defense, in INSIDE DOCTORING (Coombs et al. eds.,
1986).
27. See generally Elizabeth Mertz, Recontextualization as Socialization:
Text and Pragmatics in the Law School Classroom, in NATURAL HISTORIES OF
DISCOURSE (Michael Silverstein & Greg Urban eds., 1996).
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that during initial educational experiences, teachers encourage the
more "able" and elite students, for the most part, to read texts
with a focus on content or "semantics." 8
Scholars call this
fundamental approach to text "referentialist" ideology, because it
privileges referential or semantic content as the "autonomous
(fixed, transparent, universally available)" meaning understood as
being inherent in the text. 29
The primary focus in law school pedagogy, by contrast, is on
the "pragmatic" or contextual structure of legal texts. More
specifically, doctrinal teachers in law school classrooms train their
students to notice those aspects of pragmatic structuring that
relate most to authority. Instead of putting priority on the content
of the factual "conflict stories" told in legal texts, law professors
urge their students to analyze how the texts point to (or "index")
authority. This focus shifts the students' orientation towards
several major sources of authority: (1) the relationship between
this text and the language of other texts that provides precedent
and authoritative guidance (and correlative issues concerning the
authority of the courts, legislatures, or framers who authored
those texts); (2) the procedural history of the case, which
determines the questions a court can address, the types of
standards that are applicable to those questions, and the court's
jurisdiction or power to consider the case at all; and (3) the related
strategic questions involving framing legal arguments within this
authoritative backdrop. When first confronted with stories of
conflict between parties, students often begin by concentrating on
the drama of the conflict itself. For example, when asked to "start
developing for us the arguments for the plaintiff and the
defendant," one student begins: "Um, that-the plaintiff was a
young, youthful man."" This student is starting to "tell the story"

28. James Collins, Socialization to Text: Structure and Contradiction in
Schooled Literacy, in NATURAL HISTORIES OF DISCOURSE 203 (Michael
Silverstein & Greg Urban eds., 1996). Charles Morris distinguished three

different ways in which "signs" (that is, both linguistic and non-linguistic
signaling)

convey

meaning:

(1)

syntax

(meaning

derived

from

the

interrelationship of signs to each other); (2) semantics (the meaningful content
conveyed by a sign); and pragmatics (meaning based on the context in which a
sign is used). Charles Morris, Foundations of the Theory of Signs, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCIENCE 6 (1938).

29. Collins, supra note 28, at 224. There are some interesting exceptions to
this focus on semantics, or content, in earlier training. Classes in rhetoric, for
example, or some varieties of literary criticism, encourage students to
approach language and text more with a more complicated vision. However,

these classes tend to be uncommon in elementary and even high school
settings, and are therefore far from universal aspects of earlier education for
first-year law students.
30. Elizabeth Mertz, Transcripts from Eight Contemporaneous Contracts
Classes [hereinafter Transcripts] 3-3-3 (unpublished transcripts on file with

author).
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of the events in question through the lens of a traditional semantic
reading, one focused on character, plot, and content. The professor
subsequently admonishes her: "all I'm interested in, Ms. M., is
what the arguments are... all right? I want the arguments,
okay?"31 Throughout the subsequent interchange, the professor
repeatedly urges this student to place any "facts" concerning the
conflict story of the case within the framework of the relevant
precedential legal categories instead of focusing on morality or
narrative structure.
This move towards a more "pragmatic" reading of texts
requires students to suspend, at least temporarily, their
judgments about the emotional or moral character of events.
Thus, whether someone was right or wrong, moral or immoral,
reprehensible or ethical is not an issue in this pragmatic reading.
In another class, a student confronted her professor about whether
or not salespeople had to be honest in negotiating with customers.
The professor responded by pointing to relevant sections of a key
authoritative text for this case:
Well, if he's made an offer, he's revoked it and unless 2-205 [of the
Uniform Commercial Code] is going to be applied and there has to
be a signed writing, unless you could argue estoppel, if you're
dealing with the code number 1-103, which opens the doors to the
common law, you don't have that kind of protection, unless it's a
consumer statute, or a federal trade regulation ... regulation, you
don't have ... that kind of protection. 2
When the student responded with an indignant question, "i.e.,
salespeople can lie?", the professor hastened to disabuse her of any
notion that moral indignation or fairness were proper frames for
use in deciphering this issue:
Professor: Huh? Not only. Salespeople can lie; salespeople do lie,
constantly.
Student:

That's not fair.

Professor: No, no, fairness is not something that I accept as a
general proposition, and certainly not in my household. 33
The clear message here, as it is throughout the classes of this
study, is that a legal reading is primarily focused on "what the law
says you can or cannot do," rather than on "what's fair." Just as
medical training requires a hardening and distancing of students'
sensibilities from empathic reactions to death and human bodies,
legal training demands a bracketing of emotion and morality in
dealing with human conflict and the language of "conflict stories."

31. Id., at 3-3-4.
32. Id. at 1-7-9.
33. Id.
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Interestingly, if a key aspect of the legal approach to texts is a
rupturing of standard semantic readings of "conflict stories," then
the Socratic method actually initiates this fracture through its
linguistic structure. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, classic
Socratic teaching involves a distinctive pattern of interruption and
inversion of formal or polite speech norms. ' In addition, this style
uses predominantly negative uptake questions on the part of
professors. "Uptake" represents a measure of the degree to which
professors incorporate some feature of the student's answer in
their subsequent questions.
To the extent that professors'
questions give little or no recognition to preceding answers,
students' responses are, in effect, ignored and have little or no
impact on the ongoing conversation.
Typical Socratic questioning frequently involves both a high
frequency of interruption and low, or negative, uptake. The
primary exceptions to negative uptake occur when students
answer questions by pointing to procedural history or to precedent.
Both represent pragmatic aspects of textual authority hierarchies
to which students must attend. Thus, instead of explicitly telling
students (through the content or semantics of speech) what a new
legal reading of text entails, professors use the pragmatic
structure of classroom discourse to teach students how to read for
a distinctively legal pragmatic structuring of text. For this reason,
we can speak of an iconic or a mirroring connection between the
form of speech in the legal classroom and the approach to reading
legal text that legal pedagogy seeks to inculcate. The rupturing of
normal speech in law school classrooms uses the pragmatic, or
contextual, structure of classroom talk to reorient students. This
breaks down a more semantic, or content-based, approach to
reading stories of human conflict, drawing attention instead to
issues of textual form and authority. Professors in Socratic
classrooms teach students to focus on the contextual structure of
texts using the contextual structure of language in the classroom.
This parallel between classroom discourse structure and the legal
approach to textual language may help to explain the persistence
of Socratic teaching in the face of continuing criticism. Regardless
of whether it has any functional advantage in teaching legal
reasoning, the Socratic method may simply have a strong symbolic
appeal by virtue of pointing to and mirroring the approach to
language it promotes.
This issue raises the question of whether there is any possible
connection between the orientation to text and authority found in
legal education and the epistemology underlying legal thought in
the United States. Philosopher Stephen Toumlin uses the term
"warrant" to describe the background knowledge that permits us

34. See generally Mertz, supra note 27.
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to make assertions.35 In the legal classroom, professors focus their
students' attention on the pragmatic warrants that give legal texts
their authority. By redirecting students' attention to hierarchies
of authority, professors shift their attention away from the drama
of the human conflict and the moral dilemmas inherently involved.
As students are socialized to this new reading of legal texts, their
increasingly expert gaze moves ever more fluidly through the most
wrenching of conflict stories. The "reoriented" students search for
those key "facts" and pragmatic cues that allow them to link this
story to previous cases and situate it within its current legal
context. Indeed, a common approach to law school examinations
on the part of professors is to compose their own conflict stories,
known as "issue-spotters," through which students must sift in
order to select the most legally salient features. Frequently,
composing "issue spotters" involves throwing emotionally
compelling-but legally irrelevant-cues into the fact pattern.
This tests students on their ability to read texts for legal
pragmatics rather than for social, emotional, moral, or narrative
contexts.
There is an interesting combination of abstraction and
specificity involved in this process. In order to connect each new
conflict story with legal precedent, students must focus on detailed
aspects of the stories, in order to categorize the new facts as
instances of general, legally-specified types. For example, a
student would argue that a particular act or event in this new
conflict story constitutes a breach of contract because it is
arguably the "same" as an action or an event in a previous case
where the courts found a breach. Yet, this apparent concern for
specificity wrenches detail from its particular social and narrative
context in ways that can obscure or erase the features of the story
to which lay people look when reaching moral judgments. One
could argue that there is an attraction in the apparent neutrality
of this kind of categorization; it conveys the idea that no matter
who you are, you will be dealt with similarly. Thus, by running
the "facts" of your conflict or case through the filter of legally
relevant categories (guided by and invoking forms of legal
authority), any individual may escape the prejudices and
inequities of socially-embedded moral judgments. Indeed, we can
point to cases in which this has been the case-in which appeal to
more formal and abstract legal categories and procedures has
permitted socially-stigmatized victims to be heard. However, I
argue that there is a double-edged character to this legal
mediation, one that social theorists have found in the commodity
form more generally.
Building from the Frankfurt School, Moishe Postone, for
35. STEPHEN EDELSTON TOUMLIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 98-99 (1958).
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example, describes the complex "double character" of capital,
labor, and time in capitalist societies.36 In particular, I focus on his
insight that labor has both an abstract and concrete character in
capitalist societies. Labor has a concrete character because, in
order for society to survive, certain kind of work must be
physically performed. However, in capitalist societies, concrete
labor is mediated by an abstract level in which "individuals are
compelled to produce and exchange commodities in order to
survive."37 Postone calls this "abstract labor."" This new kind of
social mediation is "impersonal, abstract, and objective." 39 It
creates a form of domination and alienation that is quite different
from those found in other kinds of societies. However, this does
not mean that capitalism is necessarily worse than other societies,
which exerted different forms of domination. For example, in
feudal society, precisely because labor was not taken away in such
an impersonal and abstract way, Postone argues that
"expropriation... [by the non-laboring classes] was and had to be
based [more] upon direct compulsion." 9 Thus, the move to
abstraction provides both a liberating possibility and increased
opportunity for concealing the alienation of concrete labor through
an illusion of freedom. Although there is an obvious need to
proceed with caution when drawing parallels at this level of social
analysis, it is interesting that the legal language taught in the
United States also has this kind of double-edge. On the one hand,
reading legal texts for legal authority offers the student a
potentially liberating opportunity to step into an impersonal,
abstract, and objective approach to human conflict. On the other
hand, erasing many of the concrete social and contextual features
of human conflict can direct attention away from grounded moral
understandings, which some critics believe to be crucial to
achieving justice.
Moreover, this step out of social context
provides the law with a "cloak" of apparent neutrality, which can
conceal the ways in which law participates in and supports unjust
aspects of capitalist societies. This approach also gives the
appearance of dealing with concrete and specific aspects of each
conflict, thereby hiding the ways that legal approaches exclude
from systematic consideration the very details and contexts that
many would deem important for moral assessments.
As a result, the alienation experienced by some law students

36. See MOISHE POSTONE, TIME, LABOR, AND SOCIAL DOMINATION: A
REINTERPRETATION OF MARX'S CRITICAL THEORY 148-55 (1993). Postone also

finds
Id. at
37.
38.
39.
40.

a "double character" in the very categories used to analyze capitalism.
158-76.
Id. at 159.
Id at 144-48.
Id. at 158-159.
Id. at 160.
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during legal training may be an unavoidable consequence of a
process in which increasingly instrumental and technical appeals
to legal authority blunt moral and contextual judgment. Such
technical appeals lie at the heart of United States legal
epistemology and are part and parcel of the legal system's own
legitimacy. We can find another example of this process in legal
pedagogy's approach to social context and the person.
2. The People and Social Context of the Legal Landscape:
PedagogicalTranslations

Just as a distinctively legal reading of text directs attention
away from the drama of the story and its attendant moral or
emotional responses, the legal reading also provides a
characteristic approach to context and to the social construction of
the "person." In each case, such a reading does not deny the
existence of the concrete or particular-on the contrary, the
framework of legal discourse subsumes and includes specific
"facts." However, the frames of legal discourse subtly marginalize
and tame these aspects of the conflict story. Pushed to the
margins, the moral and emotional dimensions become "equities"those wildcards that every lawyer must factor when composing
legal strategies.
Thus, when we examine classroom discussions concerning the
effects of race or ethnicity on legal outcomes, we find a common
pattern. Although professors readily admit that such "extraneous"
(from a legal standpoint) factors may affect the decision of a judge
or jury, they focus primary attention on the legally controlling
aspects of the case. In dealing with the famous Dempsey case,
involving an interracial boxing match, one professor noted:
I think, it was one of the first occasions in which there was gonna be
an interracial fight, and, therefore, one of the reasons clearly not
articulated, clearly not arguable to the court, would be some racism
that would enter in-ah-some concern on the part of the court
that-ah-maybe people wouldn't pay, that they would boycott such
a fight or maybe that they would, maybe they would pay more.
Racism is not the kind of thing you would argue in the court, but it
may have been a factor certainly in the court's refusing to let the
issue go to the jury. 41
After acknowledging the possible impact of the context and
identities involved, the professor proceeded to focus the students'
attention on the "real" legal problem: the "damage issues arising
under Dempsey," which were discussed as a distinct-and more
central-matter. 2
In another classroom, the professor also
mentions race at the beginning of his discussion of Dempsey but
41. Mertz, Transcripts, supra note 30, at 3-12-8.
42. Id.
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dismisses its importance in the development of the case.43 A third
professor covered the Dempsey case with no mention of race
whatsoever." This last approach was closer to the norm of most
classroom discussions in this study. In general, professors rarely
touched on race, gender, class, history, or other aspects of social
context when analyzing the cases covered in their courses.
If law professors push certain aspects of context and identity
to the margins of classroom discourse, they make other aspects of
context part of the central inquiry.
One common type of
contextualization in these classes involves the consideration of
general occupational or legal categories, or of the "contexts"
created by differing political philosophies.45 Thus, for example,
professors frequently made sure that students paid careful
attention to the effects of occupational identity or legal categories
on the litigants' expectations and thoughts:
If you think about what we're worried is, on the one hand, the
farmer is going to go out there as soon as the price rises, all right,
make more money off his wheat, all right, thinking that he'll be
hedged, all right, he's trying to make a profit out of his wheat, okay.
And I suppose in that particular case, what might the farmer be
hoping... What might the farmer be hoping would happen?...
Notice, why is it the farmer doesn't perform? One reason is, the
market's gone up.46
There is, in a sense, a great amount of contextualization
taking place here as the professor asks students to focus on the
mental framework of the "standard average farmer." However,
the professor does not locate that farmer in social or historical
terms. This abstract form of contextualized identity appears in
even starker form when professors reduce the people involved to
"parties," "buyers" and "sellers," or "promisors" and "promisees."
In this way, the professors push students to conceptualize people
in terms of legally salient categories:
Student:

The defendant has-uh-requested information.

Professor: Is he a purchaser or seller?
Student:

Purchaser.47

Professor: All right, what happened in this case?
43. Id. at 5-8-14.
44. Id. at 4-7-8.
45. See Elizabeth Mertz, Linguistic Constructions of Difference and History
in the U.S. Law School Classroom, in DEMOCRACY AND ETHNOGRAPHY:
CONSTRUCTING

IDENTITIES

IN MULTICULTURAL

LIBERAL STATES (Carol J.

Greenhouse ed., 1998).
46. Mertz, Transcripts, supra note 30, at 8-10-18.
47. Id. at 1-6-9.
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Uh-the defendant, Oliver, was selling some land-

Professor: All right, let's talk in terms of buyer, seller, vendor,
vendee, so we can follow the case, all right. All right, go
ahead.48
Just as initial medical school training moves students away
from a personalized understanding of the human beings whose
bodies they will treat, legal education pushes law students to place
people in legal categories, using abstraction to distance themselves
from human dimensions of their clients' problems. The medical
student's eye begins to narrow on anatomical parts and systems,
losing a view of the body as a person. Likewise, the law student's
vision locates people involved in conflicts using categories that
define them in terms of argumentative positions.
Perhaps the most ubiquitous form of contextualized identity
found in these classrooms occurs when professors invite students
to play the roles of legal personae-of parties, lawyers, and
judges-and make legally relevant arguments. When asked to
play the roles of litigants or other legal actors, students "become"
abstracted individuals within a removed and "acontextual"
context. The most salient aspect of identity in these scenarios is
students' location within a legal landscape, situated in a
geography of strategies and argument:
Well, if I say I intend to give you
49 $5,000 if you climb to the top of the
Sears tower, is that an offer?
So, in other words, if I give you $5,000 this year for your tuition, is
part tuition, and $5,000 next year, your tuition. . . All right? And,
depending on how you do in school for the next two or three years,
$5,000. I'm wondering whether or not if I renege you can sue me for
breach of contract.0
Okay. What do you think, Mr. B? You are the lawyer for the
company that's seeking to fire her. What are you going to say to
argue that she should have accepted the position as appliance
clerk?"'
Thus, professors place students in the shoes of people
occupying legal "positions," located in landscapes whose key
referents are legal requirements.
The only relevant context
becomes that provided by legal argument and strategy. The
particular place in which the conflict took place is generally

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1-6-19.
Id. at 1-3-9.
Id. at 1-3-25.
Mertz, Transcripts, supra note 30, at 5-5-11.
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mentioned to help students remember the importance of
differences among jurisdictions, as if the setting had no other
function than determining legal jurisdiction:
Professor: Where is the cottage?
Student:

In Michigan.

Professor: In Michigan. Where are we in the case?
Student: We're in Wisconsin.
Professor: We're in Wisconsin. Does that raise any problems?"'
The professor's questions highlight the potential problem that
the laws in Michigan may differ from those in Wisconsin.
Additionally, dispute could arise concerning this court's authority
to hear the case. Legal training transforms "geographic" and
sociopolitical locations into "jurisdictions," where the crucial
borders are defined by the boundaries of legislatures' and courts'
authority.
Each time a professor places a student in this landscape, the
student must learn to focus on the details needed to shape a legal
argument, to convert social referents into legal categories, and to
discern the levels and types of authority. The human characters
in the conflict story become strategizing skeletons, defined by
legally delimited contexts, shaped by their places in ongoing
dialogic arguments. 3
While role-playing in the classroom
attempts to bring students to the level of actual people, the
particular roles played omit many of the social particulars that
shape not only social interactions, but also moral assessments of
those interactions.
Returning to our discussion of the distinctively capitalist
shape of law in the United States, we see that this removed
approach to the person and to human conflict feeds into an
ideology of universal translatability in which legal language serves
as a discursive medium of exchange across all areas and levels of
society. In converting virtually every possible event or conflict into
a shared rhetoric, legal language generates an appearance of
neutrality that belies its often deeply skewed institutional
workings. The classroom experience initiates law students into
this new approach using a discourse that focuses attention away

52. Id. at 4-13-16
53. I have elsewhere argued that a key aspect of legal pedagogy is training
to engage in this ongoing dialogue, where it is imperative that speakers
continue to play their roles, carrying on the argument, even when unsure of
their footing. See generally Elizabeth Mertz, Linguistic Ideology and Praxis in
U.S. Law School Classrooms, in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES (Bambi Scheiffelin et
al. eds., 1998).
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from the emotional and socially-embedded particulars of the
conflict. Instead, law professors direct their students' gaze to the
abstract categories, contexts, and actors provided by legal
doctrines, procedures, and layers of authority. Students thus
begin to learn a process of translation that they will eventually
take for granted. This legal translation is a key ground from
which they operate when performing their role as lawyers; it
embodies an epistemology that is the background "grammar" for
all legal discussion. When students speak this language, they
operate in a world where social context and identity have become
invisible.
This is the phenomenon I refer to as "cultural
invisibility." It is important to note that although some aspects of
culture become invisible in this process, other facets of dominant
culture become highly visible, so that a "cultural dominance" for
certain aspects frequently accompanies a "cultural invisibility" for
others.54 Thus, when professors translate human conflict into this
legal language, they drain away many aspects of sociocultural and
moral specificity. In doing so, they subtly erase the contexts and
details upon which most lay people would rely in forming ethical
judgments.
C. Distinctive ParticipationStructures in U.S. Legal Classrooms
Despite the existence of a common epistemology imparted
across all the classrooms in this study, there nonetheless appear to
be vast differences among the professors and students in speech
styles and degrees of participation.
Through analysis of
participation patterns, we begin to see the ways in which this
shared legal language is differentially refracted, imparted, and
absorbed by different students.
This study tracked a number of features of classroom
participation, including length and number of turns in which each
student and professor participated. The resulting picture is
complex, but some patterns are tentatively identifiable. Because
we worked in depth in eight classes, the study is most properly
understood as a set of comparative case studies. By combining
comparisons among the classes of this study with the data
generated by other in-depth research on law schools, we begin to
delineate interesting trends and generate hypotheses for further
research.
Previous observational studies of gender in law school
education indicated generally lower participation rates for female
54. I am indebted to Susan Hirsch and Leti Volpp for making this point
clear to me. See generally Susan Hirsch, Making Culture Visible: Comments
on Elizabeth Mertz's "Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and
Anthropological Translations",34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 119 (2000); Leti Volpp,
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 60 (1994).
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students than for male students at Yale and University of Chicago
law schools." Interestingly, the two more comprehensive studies
did not find that the presence of a female professor helped to
equalize gendered participation patterns. 6 A similar picture of
women's overall participation emerged from self-reports of
participation rates in studies performed at a number of other law
schools, including the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford,
Berkeley, and nine Ohio law schools: "Many women report,
however, that when speaking in class feels like a 'performance,'
they respond with silence rather than participation. " " Another
recent study across a wide variety of law schools showed that even
when women performed as well as men in school, they were less
satisfied with the law school experience than men." Similarly,
studies found that students of color reported negative results
regarding overall satisfaction and participation. 9
This study's results lend some support to these previous
findings. Overall, women students participated at lower rates
than men in all classes taught by men. ° In the one class taught by
55. See Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty
Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1364-65 (1988) (tracking the amounts,
percentages, and frequency of comments/responses by men and women in a
law school class); Karen Wilson & Sharon Levin, The Sex-Based Disparity in
Class Participation,THE PHOENIX (University of Chicago Law School student
newspaper), Nov. 26, 1991, at 3 (discussing participation based on gender at
the University of Chicago); Mary Becker, Questions Women (and Men) Should
Ask When Selecting a Law School, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 417, 419 (1997).
56. See Weiss & Melling, supra note 55, at 1364-65 (reporting a ratio of 1.9
[meaning that men spoke almost twice as much as women did] in one class
taught by a female professor in the Yale study); THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
LAW SCHOOL, GENDER STUDY 1993 1 (1993).

57. Guinier et al., supra note 22, at 46 n.117. See also Homer & Schwartz,
supra note 22, at 50; Joan M. Krauskopf, Touching the Elephant: Perceptions
of Gender Issues in Nine Law Schools, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311, 314, 325-26
(1994) (reporting in table and text form the results of self-evaluation
questionnaires regarding law school participation). Taunya Banks reported
parallel results in two earlier studies of unidentified law schools across the
country. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 137, 141 (1988) (surveying five law schools); Tanya Lovell Banks,
Gender Bias in the Classroom, 14 S.ILL. L.J. 527, 530-35 (1990) (surveying
fourteen private and public law schools).
58. See generally SANDER & KNAPLUND, supra note 22.
59. See, e.g., Homer & Schwartz, supra note 22; Krauskopf, supra note 57;
Banks, supra note 57. Astonishingly, given the amount of public controversy
and litigation on issues of race in legal education, there were no previous
observational studies tracking racial dynamics in law school classrooms.
60. Participant ratios of total time taken by students showed that
proportionate to their numbers in the class, male participation rates ranged
from 12% to 38% higher than female rates in male-taught classes.
Disproportion in favor of male students in terms of total turns ranged from
10% to 17% in these classes. See Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does
Difference Make? The Challenge for Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 46
(1998) (reporting data on class participation in eight semester-long contracts
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a female professor in an elite school, women also participated less
than men." On the other hand, in two non-elite law school classes
taught by female professors, women students participated at
nearly equal or slightly higher levels than did men.62 Women
generally spoke less in the more Socratic classrooms.63
Interestingly, students of color participated at high levels in
classes taught by professors of color." In fact, these were the only
classrooms in which students of color became dominant speakers
in classroom exchanges.65 Moreover, this effect carried over into
elite schools.66
When we examine these findings in light of the fact that
white male professors still dominate the first-year curriculum in
most U.S. law schools, we find yet another kind of cultural
invisibility/dominance problem emerging in the teaching of law. If
students of color and female students tend to be more silent in
these classrooms, then any differences these students bring with
them in experience or background are not given voice in classroom
discourse. To the extent that these differences in experience
reflect race, gender, class, or other aspects of social identity, we
again see aspects of social structure and difference pushed to the

classes and noting contextual complexity and patterns of reduced participation
by women and minorities).
61. In the elite school class taught by a woman, there was a 38%
disproportion in favor of men in terms of time, and a 54% disproportion in
favor of men in terms of turns. Id.
62. In the two female-taught classes at non-elite schools, there were 7%
disproportion in favor of women students in terms of time and 5%
disproportion in terms of turns. Id.
63. Id. at 60.
64. Id. at 62. The report notes that where a professor of color instructs the
class:
In turns, students of color participate more than white students in both
classes; in time, students of color have a favorable ration in the smaller
class.
Note that in terms of time, students of color participate
(proportionately) 15 percent less than white students in the larger
class-and this was the largest class in the study. The 15 percent
figure, although not favorable to students of color, is the smallest
disproportion of all the classes in which white students had higher
proportional times; the disproportions in the other classrooms ranged
from 34 to a whopping 289 percent in class 1. Note also that the
disproportion in terms of time in the larger class is largely attributable
to lack of participation by Asian-American students [ 1, who had a 220
percent negative disproportion in time. In contrast, African-American
students participated proportionately 10 percent more than EuropeanAmericans.
Id. In addition, there were also favorable proportions for students of color in
one of the "regional" law schools in which the class was taught by a EuropeanAmerican male professor. Id. at 63.
65. Mertz, supra note 60, at 65-66.
66. See id. (noting that students of color participated more actively in
courses taught by professors of color in elite schools).
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margins of legal discourse. The previous discussion demonstrated
this tendency in the content of law school teaching; here we see a
similar marginalizing in the actual structure of voices heard in
law school classrooms.
This raises a concern about the overall culture of the
classroom, an issue that is independent of concerns about student
performance on exams. In other words, even if there is no
connection between class participation and grades, we can still ask
what the classroom culture conveys to students about law and its
central priorities-and correlatively, about which voices can speak
in the language of the law. If certain voices, attitudes, and
experiences become invisible during lawyers' formative training,
this arguably sends a message about what the law values (and
what is unimportant or irrelevant).
There is obviously some need for caution in developing an
understanding of the way that "cultural invisibility/dominance"
becomes a feature of training across different law school
classrooms.
Indeed, this study itself suggests some possible
variable patterning based on school status, teaching style, and
classroom dynamics. I do not intend to suggest a simplistic or
homogenous model of this process; rather, the results of the study
provide a broad outline which contains many interesting
complexities and nuances. However, to the degree that we notice
an erasure of the voices and experiences of traditionally
marginalized people, we arguably uncover vital clues to the
underlying worldview taught to law students. Both the linguistic
structure and the linguistic ideology of law school pedagogy convey
this worldview.
An anthropological perspective does not yield simplistic or
easy answers, nor does it point the way to "quick fixes" for any
problems that exist in the training of lawyers in the United States.
To the contrary, it pays full respect to the depth of the connections
between the training and underlying cultural epistemologies. Nor
does this approach generate a one-dimensional view of legal
education; the anthropological perspective does not identify a
"bad" or "good" aspect of teaching law that is somehow definitive.
Rather, it focuses attention on the complex interaction of
institutional and social worldviews, educational structures, and
linguistic contexts that shape legal training.
D. Summary and Implications
This study indicates a possible reason for continued
adherence to a distinctive Socratic teaching approach, even after
critics had discredited the foundational philosophy underlying this
method. If, as Garth and Martin demonstrate, one of the primary
skills taught well by law schools is "legal reasoning," then Socratic
training contains a precise linguistic mirroring of aspects of that
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reasoning." The argument, then, is that this kind of training has
a symbolic resonance that generates a particularly strong tie
between the form of classroom language and the epistemological
message conveyed by that language. Even in classrooms in which
Socratic pedagogy is less prevalent, we still find features of law
school discourse that convey a distinctive approach to language,
text, authority, and morality. This approach frames human
conflict within a new context that, at the same time, takes account
of and neutralizes many of the "heated" social specificities
commonly used to form situated moral judgments. Arguably, a
mere shift in legal pedagogy may not suffice to address the
complaints of alienation during legal training because that
alienation results in part from fundamental aspects of the
language and epistemology taught to law students. Unless legal
language and the fundamental logic of the legal system change,
these complaints may remain inevitable concomitants of training
that is effective in teaching that language and logic.
Although there are doubtless multiple other reasons for law
students' progressive shift away from public interest ambitions,68
the underlying language and worldview described above could
partially explain this trend. As we have seen, the prevailing
process and linguistic structure of legal education detaches
students from their ethical moorings and focuses them, instead, on
the structure of authority provided by law. Public interest
commitments require students to focus on substantive justice-a
focus undermined by constant attention to strategic
considerations. Through subtle, unconscious aspects of classroom
language, legal pedagogy continually urges students away from a
focus on ethics and justice. 9 Thus, legal training never overtly
discourages students from maintaining an emotional commitment
to social justice. In fact, in some classrooms, professors may
expressly encourage students to hold onto such considerations.
But at a constant, quiet level, the meta-linguistic prioritizing of
authority over ethics-as well as ubiquitous indexing of pragmatic
warrants-wears gently but powerfully away at substantive
concerns.
67. Garth & Martin, supra note 17, at 508.
68. This shift is documented in numerous studies. See generally STOVER,
supra note 4; Erlanger et al., supra note 12; Erlanger & Kiegon, supra note 12.
69. On the ways in which linguistic structure creates effects of which
speakers are partially or completely aware, see Michael Silverstein, The
Limits of Awareness, in WORKING PAPERS IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS, No. 84 (1981);
also Richard Parmentier, The Political Function of Reported Speech, in
REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE: REPORTED SPEECH AND METAPRAGMATICS (John Lucy
ed., 1993); Elizabeth Mertz & Bernard Weissbourd, Legal Ideology and
Linguistic Theory: Variability and Its Limits, in SEMIOTIC MEDIATION:
SOCIOCULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Elizabeth Mertz &
Richard Parmentier eds., 1985).
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Returning to issues of diversity and inclusion, we have seen
that a number of studies pointed to differential alienation by
students of color and white women in law schools. Because these
groups tend to enter law school with strong commitments to public
interest work, 0 the general move away from these concerns that
occurs during legal training might be one reason for their high
degree of dissatisfaction with the law school process. However, we
have also seen two other possible reasons for this problem. First,
the content and style of teaching render aspects of social context
invisible-aspects that arguably have greater salience for people
Second, there are
who have been socially marginalized.
indications that the structure of the legal classroom differentially
silences students from these traditionally excluded categories
during the first-year law school courses. Thus, this study's
findings support suggestions by Brook Baker that aspects of the
actual teaching structure in law classrooms may differentially
disadvantage students with different experiences and learning
styles]" Baker's work contains rich additional information about
how traditional law school classrooms tend to exclude particular
kinds of students. On multiple levels, then, this research makes
sense of findings on differential satisfaction and participation in
law school classes.
Finally, this paper considers the ways in which this
distinctive linguistic approach fits within broader legal
epistemology in the United States. It notes a tension that emerges
between abstract categories and conceptions of justice, on the oneA
hand, and, on the other hand, the democratic ideals of inclusion
that require more social, contextual, and grounded moral
reasoning. When considered in this framework, the problem of
"cultural invisibility/dominance" in legal training emerges as a
profound challenge. There is a certain genius about a system of
legal reasoning that treats all individuals the "same," within
safely abstract layers of legal categories and authorities,
regardless of social identity or context. Yet this process pulls
students away from grounded moral judgment and fully
contextualized consideration of human conflict. This can produce
an ongoing alienation-legal decision-making from ethics and of
lawyers from socially shared values.
Thus, across diverse areas of inquiry within the study of legal
education, this study suggests the value of studying cultural
frameworks as they are enacted and expressed in language. As
70. See generally GRANFIELD, supra note 21; SANDER & KNAPLUND, supra
note 22.
71. See generally Brook Baker, Beyond MacCrate: The Role of Context,
Experience, Theory, and Reflection in Ecological Learning, 36 ARIZ. L. REV.
287 (1994).
72. Id.
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students are taught this language, they begin to hear some voices
but erase others, to focus on legal authority and texts but not on
morality.
These initiates to the legal profession learn new
attitudes toward human conflict, ethics, authority, social context,
and identity-not through heavy handed admonitions, but through
the subtle reframing of language structure and ideology imparted
by their professors. Their own voices shift, and as they undergo a
reorientation toward spoken and written language, they achieve
new identities as lawyers.
II.

CODA-PROCEED WITH CAUTION: LEGAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL
TRANSLATIONS

Given this picture of a canonical form of legal language and
epistemology, what is the prognosis for an adequate translation of
anthropological and other contextual forms of understanding to
legal language? The findings of this study suggest, at the very
least, that one should be quite cautious in assuming that canonical
legal language is capable of these kinds of translations.
Anthropological approaches, in particular, fundamentally depend
on a deeply contextual understanding, situating human
interaction within historically and socially specific frames and
paying close attention to minute details of particular events and
talk across social divisions.73 One effect of this more thorough
contextualization is that non-dominant aspects of culture and
context become integral parts of an anthropological analysis. A
legal language bent on translating these detailed analyses into
types of events and interactions, using an epistemological focus
generated by the society's elite, would miss much of the core
explanatory apparatus and method of anthropological studies.
Indeed, anthropologists would study and analyze the extent to
which elite culture erases evidence of social inequality through
typification processes, while formal legal language might simply
perform this erasure without reflection. Susan Hirsch's recent
book on African Islamic courts provides an elegant example of an
anthropological approach, analyzing how class and gender are
differentially refracted in legal negotiations.74 In particular, she
demonstrates the divergent relationships to legal text and legal
discourse created by social divisions.
Anthropologist Susan
Philips has recently made a similar point about the process by
which guilty pleas are negotiated in Arizona criminal courts."
On the other hand, as Baker and others have pointed out, the
73. For an excellent example of this approach, see SUSAN HIRSCH,
PRONOUNCING AND PERSEVERING: GENDER AND THE DISCOURSES OF
DISPUTING IN AN AFRICAN ISLAMIC COURT (1999).
74. Id. at 9-11, 88.
75. See generally SUSAN PHILIPS, IDEOLOGY IN THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES:
How JUDGES PRACTICE LAW, POLITICS, AND COURTROOM CONTROL (1998).
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language that is taught in a traditional doctrinal classroom is not
the only kind of law school language.16 Law students learn their
craft across multiple settings, including legal skills classrooms,
clinics, and externships. It is precisely these settings that require
forms of speech more sensitive to context and tailored to the
specific situation at hand. One implication of this study is that in
order to escape the limitations of the a contextual language that
forms the backbone of doctrinal learning, law schools may have to
look to those areas of legal education sometimes deemed to be on
the "fringes" in order to locate their teaching more centrally in this
diverse and changing world to which lawyers must respond. If
lawyers could learn from the "fringes," and listen to parts of
society that are often erased from dominant discourses, they would
internalize some of the best lessons that the anthropological
tradition has to offer.

76. See Brook Baker, Language Acculturation Processes and Resistance to
In"doctrine"ationin the Legal Skills Curriculum and Beyond: A Commentary
on Mertz's Critical Anthropology of the Socratic, Doctrinal Classroom, 34 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 131, 154-56 (2000) (discussing distinctions in legal
pedagogy between the doctrinal classroom and the legal skills classroom).

